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FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 5363, APRIL 15, 11 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

SENT DEPARTMENT 5363; REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 838, BONN 363, MOSCOW 213, BERLIN 124.

PARIS FOR EMBASSY AND USRO

DEPARTMENT PASS DEFENSE

FROM HILLENBRAND.

DISCUSSION AT MEETING OF WORKING GROUP TODAY FOCUSED ON THREE TACTICS PAPERS TABLED BY USDEL ON APRIL 13:

A. GENERAL TACTICS.

1. IN INTRODUCTORY REMARKS WE POINTED OUT THAT GENERAL POSITION REFLECTED BY OUR TACTICS PAPER WAS BASED ON TWO BROAD ASSUMPTIONS;

(1) THAT THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT SOVIETS INTEND SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AT MAY 11 CONFERENCE AND

(2) THAT WEST WOULD BE IN POSITION TO PRESENT PACKAGE PLAN WITH CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC APPEAL.

UK POINTED OUT THAT BEFORE WE WILL BE IN POSITION TO DEVELOP FINAL TACTICS PAPER WE MUST ARRIVE AT JUDGMENT AS TO WHETHER SOVIETS WILL REJECT WESTERN PROPOSALS IN THEIR ENTIRETY OR WHETHER THERE IS IN FACT SOME POSSIBILITY OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AT MAY 11 CONFERENCE. BRITISH VIEW IS THAT WHILE FORMER IS PROBABLE, WE CANNOT EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY THAT SOVIETS MAY ENGAGE IN SERIOUS

DISCUSSIONS SINCE

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DISCUSSIONS SINCE KHRUSHCHEV MAY CONSIDER THAT A CERTAIN MEASURE OF NEGOTIATION WOULD PROVIDE BEST INSURANCE OF SUMMIT MEETING WHICH HE OBVIOUSLY SEEKS. IF THERE IS MERIT TO THIS REASONING, UK WOULD OPPOSE US SUGGESTION FOR POSSIBLE ADVANCE PUBLICITY TO WESTERN PLAN AND WOULD QUESTION DESIRABILITY OF ITS PUBLICATION AFTER TABLING AT CONFERENCE.


3. SHARING UK VIEW THAT FINAL DECISION ON TACTICS DEPENDS ON BEST ESTIMATE AS TO SOVIET INTENTIONS, FRENCH OPINED THAT SOVIETS MIGHT WELL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF WESTERN PLAN (E.G., CONCEPT OF ALL GERMAN COMMITTEE AND POSSIBLY SECURITY MEASURES CONTINUED IN SECOND STAGE). THIS WOULD BE A GENUINE POSSIBILITY IF, AS FRENCH BELIEVE, SOVIET IMMEDIATE CONFERENCE OBJECTIVES WOULD BE RELATED TO THEIR LONG TERM OFFENSIVE TO MODIFY BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE AND NOT SIMPLY TO IMPROVEMENT IN BERLIN SITUATION FROM SOVIET POINT OF VIEW. FRENCH THEREFORE QUESTION WISDOM OF ADVANCE PUBLICITY FOR WESTERN PLAN AND DOUBT DESIRABILITY OF TABLING ENTIRE PLAN ON FIRST DAY OF CONFERENCE. INSTEAD THEY WOULD PREFER TO PRESENT AT OUTSET SIMPLY OUTLINE OF PLAN CITING NEW ELEMENTS DIFFERENTIATING IT FROM PREVIOUS GENEVA PROPOSALS AND DEFER TABLING OF ENTIRE PLAN UNTIL AFTER COMPREHENSIVE REFUTATION OF SOVIET ARGUMENTS FOR DISCUSSION OF PEACE TREATY. SUCH TACTICS FRENCH BELIEVE WOULD OFFER PROSPECT WEST TO ASCERTAIN SOFT POINTS OF SOVIET POSITION BEFORE FULL WESTERN POSITION HAS BEEN EXPOSED TO SOVIET FIRE.

4. WHILE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS GERMANS EXPRESSED GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH FRENCH AND UK VIEWS ON POSSIBILITY OF SOME MEASURE OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS AND ALSO FIRMLY OPPOSED ADVANCE PUBLICITY FOR PLAN BEFORE OPENING OF CONFERENCE. BAUDISSIN THEN UNDER INSTRUCTIONS EXPRESSED GERMAN VIEW ON TACTICAL DESIRABILITY OF DISCUSSING BERLIN PROBLEM BEFORE WESTERN PLAN, CITING FOLLOWING ADVANTAGES:

A. WOULD AFFORD POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT OF BERLIN SITUATION WITHOUT BEING SUBJECTED TO SOVIET

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TO SOVIET PRESSURES WHICH WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON OTHER PROBLEMS

B. WOULD PERMIT WESTERN POWERS TO DEAL WITH BERLIN QUESTION WITHOUT BEING EXPOSED TO RISK OF RECOGNIZING GDR; AND


C. IF PRINCIPAL NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD FAIL AND SOVIETS SUBSEQUENTLY RESORT TO SEPARATE PEACE TREATY WITH GDR, WEST WOULD BE LESS VULNERABLE IF SOLUTION OF BERLIN PROBLEM AGREED PREVIOUSLY.

5. WE TOGETHER WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE DOUBTS ABOUT GERMAN PROPOSAL, POINTING OUT THAT IF WEST WERE TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO DISCUSSION OF BERLIN PROBLEM DOUBTFUL IF SOVIETS WOULD EVER AGREE TO DISCUSSION REUNIFICATION. FRENCH ALSO CITED AS MAJOR DISADVANTAGE TO GERMAN PROPOSAL THAT BY INSERTING BERLIN IN STAGE ONE AND PROCEEDING TO A SEPARATE DISCUSSION OF BERLIN QUESTION, WE WOULD IN EFFECT INVITE SOVIETS TO DISMANTLE PLAN BY INDICATING OUR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS ELEMENTS THEREOF SEPARATELY. THEY CONCEDED THAT IT MIGHT PROVE TACTICALLY DESIRABLE TO DISCUSS BERLIN SEPARATELY AT SOME STAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS, PRESUMABLY AFTER THOROUGH EXPRESSION OF WESTERN VIEWS ON REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN EUROPE, BUT SUGGESTED THAT MORE SUITABLE BASIS THEREFOR WOULD BE INSERTION IN STAGE ONE OF GENERAL DECLARATION CONFIRMING RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF FOUR POWERS. THIS PROCEDURE WHICH DID NOT INVOLVE MENTIONING BERLIN SPECIFICALLY WOULD NOT, LIKE GERMAN PROPOSAL, INDICATE WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS ELEMENTS OF PLAN SEPARATELY. GERMANS IN LIGHT OF OPPOSITION PROMISED TO SEEK NEW INSTRUCTIONS.

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6. IN SUBSEQUENT DETAILED DISCUSSION OF US TACTICS PAPER, FRENCH STATED THAT THEY SEE NO GREAT ADVANTAGE TO WEST IN DISCUSSION OF COMPOSITION OVER AGENDA SINCE THEY DOUBT IF SOVIETS WOULD RAISE ANY SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES OVER AGENDA AND QUESTION WHETHER THEY ARE SINCERE IN EXPRESSED INSISTENCE ON POLISH AND CZECH PARTICIPATION. RE ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION WHICH FOREIGN MINISTERS MAY BE FACED WITH, FRENCH SAID WEST SHOULD BE VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT DISCUSSION OF PEACE TREATY EVEN ON STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES BASIS, AND SUGGESTED QUESTION SHOULD BE LEFT TO DECISION BY FOREIGN MINISTERS. WHILE WE CITED SECTION OF AGREED MINUTE WITH REGARD TO TABLING OF STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, NEITHER FRENCH NOR BRITISH SEEM TO TAKE THIS SERIOUSLY AND LATTER EXPRESSED VIEW THAT SELWYN LLOYD, WHO AUTHORED THIS PART OF MINUTE, HAD NOT REALLY THOUGHT THROUGH ITS IMPLICATIONS. FRENCH STATED THAT IF WE SHOULD REACH POINT OF DISCUSSING PEACE TREATY, BEST WESTERN TACTIC WOULD BE TO TAKE POSITION THAT PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS WHICH SOVIETS INTEND TO SOLVE BY CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATY RELATED TO ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH WESTERN PLAN SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH.

B. GERMAN

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B. GERMAN PARTICIPATION PAPER

AT UK SUGGESTION AGREED THAT GERMAN AND POLISH-CZECH PARTICIPATION PAPERS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS ANNEXES TO PRINCIPAL TACTICS PAPER.


1. UK QUESTIONED WHETHER WE SHOULD CATEGORICALLY REJECT IDEA OF INVITING GERMAN ADVISERS TO SPEAK DURING NEGOTIATIONS, POINTING OUT THAT DEVELOPMENTS AT CONFERENCE COULD CONCEIVABLY WARRANT ACCEPTANCE THIS PROCEDURE. IN RESPONSE TO HANCOCK'S QUERY ON THIS POINT, GERMAN DELEGATION SAID IT WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS.

2. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION AS TO BEST METHOD OF HANDLING SUCH PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS AS WHERE GERMAN ADVISERS SHOULD SIT AND HOW THEY SHOULD BE DESIGNATED DURING CONFERENCE. AT FRENCH SUGGESTION, IT WAS TENTATIVELY AGREED THAT PRESENTATION WESTERN POSITION MIGHT BETTER BE HANDLED BY INFORMAL MEETING WITH SOVIETS PRIOR TO CONFERENCE (AS AT GENEVA, 1955) PRECEDED BY MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF FOUR WESTERN POWERS, (PRESUMABLY SECRETARIES GENERAL OF US, UK, AND FRANCE TOGETHER WITH FEDREP). THIS FRENCH BELIEVED IS PREFERABLE TO DISCUSSION OF SUBJECT MOSCOW.

3. UK REPORTED FOLLOWING COMPOSITION OF GDR DELEGATION BASED ON "SECRET INTELLIGENCE REPORT": BOLZ, WINZER, WILHELM MEISSNER, SIEGFRIED BECH (TREATY AFFAIRS DIVISION) AND STEFAN HEYMANN (PRESS DIVISION). HANCOCK THEN ASKED BAUDISSION IF HE INFORMED RE COMPOSITION OF FEDREP DELEGATION. BAUDISSION REPLIED THAT WHILE HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS, PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT LEVEL OF FEDREP DELEGATION WOULD DEPEND, TO SOME EXTENT, ON PARTICIPATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES. HE SAID ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS THAT VON BRENTANO NOT PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ATTENDING.

4. WE POINTED

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4. WE POINTED OUT, AND OTHER DELEGATIONS AGREED, THAT HIGHER LEVEL OF GERMAN REPRESENTATION GREATER THE DANGER OF SLIPPAGE TOWARD SOME MEASURE OF RECOGNITION OF GDR. IT WAS CONSENSUS THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME ADVANTAGE, DESPITE HIGH LEVEL OF GDR DELEGATION IN FEDREP'S NOT SENDING FOREIGN MINISTER TO GENEVA IN ORDER TO DISCOURAGE SOVIET FROM URGING BILATERAL GERMAN TALKS.

C. POLISH-CZECH PAPER

WHILE THERE APPEARED TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH US SUGGESTIONS FOR TACTICAL HANDLING OF POLISH-CZECH PARTICIPATION, BOTH FRENCH AND BRITISH SEEMED RATHER ANNOYED ABOUT NEED FOR RECOGNIZING COMMITMENT TO ITALY. IN DISCUSSION OF ITALY'S RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE, UK POINTED OUT THAT CANADA HAD A MUCH BETTER CLAIM. FRENCH WONDERED IF, BY AGREEING TO ITALY'S PARTICIPATION, WE WOULD NOT BE FACED AUTOMATICALLY FOR NEED TO RECOGNIZE DUTCH CLAIM.

AT CONCLUSION OF SESSION, USDEL TABLED BERLIN PAPER.

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